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Logistics and Chaco War: Bolivia versus Paraguay, 1932-351

Matthew Hughes

The Journal of Military History, Volume 69, Number 2, April2005, pp. 411-437

Introduction

Covered with low dense vegetation, the Chaco region (Gran Chacoor Chaco Boreal) that

separated Bolivia and Paraguay was a flat roadless wildernessinhabited almost exclusively

by indigenous Indians. Since their formation as independentrepublics in the nineteenth

century, neither Bolivia nor Paraguay was able to agree on acommon border in the Chaco

region. Land-locked Bolivias desire to push across the Chaco toreach the Paraguay river,

from whence it could reach the sea, led to clashes withParaguayan forces in the 1920s that

escalated to full-scale war in 1932. With casualty ratesequivalent to those of the powers that

fought the First World War, the Chaco War, 1932-35, was SouthAmericas bloodiest inter-

state conflict of the twentieth century. In a war in which bothsides fielded armies totalling

almost 400,000 men, Bolivia lost c.2 per cent of its population(56-65,000 dead) and

Paraguay c.3.5 per cent (36,000 dead).2 It saw the mobilizationof war economies, the use of

French and German military advisory teams, large-scalebattlefield engagements, the

development of war-time alliances and the deployment of thesorts of modern weaponry that

would become commonplace in the Second World War.3 It was atraining ground a South-

American Spanish Civil War for the Second World War, although itis not clear what

lessons, if any, the protagonists of the Second World War drewfrom the Chaco War. As

Pierre Mondain aptly noted in Revue Historique, the Chaco Warpossde toutes les

caractristiques dune guerre moderne pour lpoque.4 It was also awar in which Paraguay,

by far the smaller, weaker power, emerged victorious in 1935, incontrol of the entire

disputed Chaco region, and so was able to dictate the terms ofthe peace signed in Buenos

Aires in 1938.

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The English-language historiography on the war is minimal.Margarita Kallsens Referencias

Bibliogrficas de la Guerra del Chaco (1982), published inAsuncin, lists some 450 books

and articles on the war.5 Of this total, only fourteen are inEnglish some of which are

dissertations or government publications and only the two booksby Bruce Farcau and

David Zook are military as opposed to diplomatic histories ofthe war.6 A more recent

Bolivian bibliography published in 1996 lists 187 books on thewar, only one of which is in

English.7 Of the approximately 350 books on the shelves of theMunicipal Library in

Asuncin dealing with the Chaco War, none is in English.8 Somejournal articles in English,

French and Czech add to our understanding of the fighting of theChaco war, but these

articles compare poorly in both quantity and quality to thescholarship on other conflicts of

the twentieth century.9 Nor is this gap filled by the moregeneral texts on South American

history. Harris Gaylord Warrens Paraguay: An Informal History(1949) is atypical in that it

devotes two chapters to the war; Leslie Bethells CambridgeHistory of Latin America

(1991), in which the war gets but a passing mention, is far moretypical and indicative of

historical studies focussed on broader societal, economic andpolitical change in the region.

The extensive Spanish-language literature on the war isdominated by publishing houses

based in La Paz and Asuncin and ranges from battle narrativesand personal memoirs from

Bolivian and Paraguayan war veterans, to more general studiessometimes from a Marxist

neo-imperialistic perspective10 on the military, economic,political and diplomatic

dimensions to the war.11 With the exception of the memoirs ofthe Paraguayan field

commander during the war, Colonel (later Marshal) Jos FelixEstigarribia, none of this

corpus has been translated into English.12 The Spanish-languagesources are not at the cutting

edge of military-history study. Often written from a partisanperspective by serving or retired

soldiers, many simply recount the military events of the war andascribe victory to personal

or national heroism. But to this organized and arrogant power weintended to oppose the

virile tradition of our people and the discipline of our couragewas Estigarribias partial and

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contestable assessment of why Paraguay won, and one which can becategorized as an heroic

interpretation of the Chaco War.13 It is difficult in theSpanish-language literature to discern

any clear trends in terms of a conceptual, analytical ortheoretical framework with a critical,

objective core that unpacks the main military aspects of thewar, precisely the sort of

approach that is becoming commonplace for military studies ofthe other major wars of the

contemporary period. David Zooks The Conduct of the Chaco War(1960) was quickly

translated into Spanish by an Argentinean publisher in 1962 (asLa conduccin de la Guerra

del Chaco) precisely because his contribution was so unlike theSouth-American books

written on the war. Indeed, the best Spanish-language works onthe Chaco War such as

Alfredo Seiferhelds Economa y Petrleo durante la Guerra delChaco (1983) take as their

primary focus non-military aspects to the conflict,conceptualizing the war in the context of

oil, economic change and global capitalism. The role played bythe oil industry in promoting

and sustaining the conflict with, it is argued, Standard Oil ofNew Jersey and Royal Dutch-

Shell clashing over the potential oil wealth of the Chaco, hasprompted a distinct and

distracting strand of analysis of the Chaco War.14 The idea thatoil was the determining factor

in the Chaco War even found its way into the 1935 Tintinchildrens adventure story

LOreille Casse published in English as The Broken Ear by GeorgesRemi, who wrote

under the name of Herg. In fact, there is little hard evidenceavailable in company or

government archives to support the theory that oil companies hadanything to do with causing

the war or helping one side or the other during the war.

This article represents a critical new history that aims todevelop the scholarship on the

Chaco War by presenting a military history of the conflict thatwill argue that a far superior

logistical infrastructure built up before and during the warhelped to determine Paraguays

eventual victory. Effective logistical preparations allowed oneland-locked state, Paraguay, to

engage successfully a superior opponent, also land-locked, in awar with indifferent tactics

and, by December 1933, achieve an operational success that ledto victory in 1935 and the

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realization of the grand strategy (or policy) objective ofending the Bolivian threat to the

Chaco region. Logistics is defined here in broader terms thanBaron Jominis the practical

art of moving armies or Martin van Crevelds the practical art ofmoving armies and

keeping them supplied to include the preparation of the supplysystems that are used once

war starts.15 This more holistic definition is taken from theOxford Companion to Military

History (2001) and underpins the analysis in this article:Logistics concerns not only the

supply of matriel to an army in times of war, but also theability of the national

infrastructure and manufacturing base to equip, support, andsupply the armed forces the

national transportation system to move forces and its ability toresupply these forces once

deployed.16

Neither Bolivia nor Paraguay had a domestic arms industry beforeit went to war.17 The

considerable quantities of matriel needed for the Chaco Warincluding tanks, warplanes,

750-ton naval monitors (used on the river Paraguay), heavy andlight artillery, anti-aircraft

guns, flame-throwers, trucks, sophisticated optical rangingdevices, clothing, saddles, rifles

and automatic weaponry all had to be sourced, ordered, paid for,imported from Europe and

America, and then transported to the flat, desolate waste of theChaco. The lack of matriel

was the decisive factor that pushed back the start of the war to1932. In the 1920s, especially

in 1927-28, there were military clashes in the Chaco, butneither side felt able to escalate

these border skirmishes until they had acquired the means tofight a full-scale war.18 From

1921 to 1932, Bolivia and Paraguay busily prepared for war andthe process whereby they

acquired arms and equipment helped to determine the outcome ofthe Chaco War.

This is not to say that logistics was the determining factor inParaguays victory. During the

war, Paraguay had a superior officer corps, better seniorcommand and a far more favourable

grand strategy position surrounded as it was by broadlysympathetic neighbouring states. By

contrast, Bolivia had a chaotic internal political system, weakmilitary command at all levels,

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a poorly motivated army with low morale and was isolatedinternationally. The war was also

fought close to Paraguays heartland, aiding its eventualsuccess, and when Paraguay went on

the offensive in 1934 Bolivia was then able to check itsoverstretched forces operating far

from home. The argument here is that the logistical focus ofthis article forms a key element

in the matrix of factors that helps to explain Paraguayssuccesses in the Chaco War.

Moreover, the broad discussion of logistics as suggested in thisarticle dovetails with many of

the other factors detailed above, thus adding to any completeexamination of the more general

planning, course and consequences of an oft-neglectedtwentieth-century war.

Bolivia

At first sight, Bolivia seemed well prepared for a war over theChaco. It had three times

Paraguays population, an army three times as big and a richminerals base with which it

could sustain itself and earn foreign currency to buy arms. Bycontrast, Paraguay was

extremely poor, had a very weak economy and the British WarOffice was not alone in

concluding that unless the Argentine takes a hand, Boliviashould win in any war against a

pre-war 2400-strong Paraguayan army equipped with outdatedweapons and one that the

British did not consider to be a very serious fighting force.19Moreover, in 1926, Bolivia

signed a huge arms deal with the British arms manufacturerVickers-Armstrong that was to

provide it with the means to fight a war for the Chaco.20 Farcaucosts the arms deal at

3,000,000, later trimmed, due to a fall in the price of Boliviantin, to 1,250,000 million;

Zook prices the deal at 2,190,000, and lists the arms bought asfifteen warplanes, 65

batteries of artillery, 50,000 rifles, 10,000 carbines, 300machine guns, 760 automatic rifles

and an abundance of ammunition.21 In Paraguays submission to theLeague of Nations in

1934, it estimated the Vickers deal to be worth 3,000,000.22None of these figures is exact.

From May 1926, Captain F.J. Fairburn-Crawford of Vickers hadbeen in La Paz negotiating

with the Bolivian government for an arms deal.23 Worth1,870,000, the two sides signed the

final contract on 2 October 1926.24 The reduced figure of1,870,000 or $9,030,230 at a

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1925 exchange rate of $4.829 to 1 is still an impressive sum,and it provided Bolivia with

everything it needed for a sustained conflict over the Chaco:196 artillery pieces ranging from

25mm. anti-aircraft guns to 105mm. heavy guns, 36,000 rifles,6000 carbines, 750 machine

guns, 12 warplanes, 2.5 million rounds, 10-20,000 shells foreach of the different type of

artillery pieces, 20,000 gas masks, helmets, bicycles, wirelessequipment, lances, armoured

motor-cycles, medical equipment, tents, water-bottles, bags,spades, wagons, plus much else.

Vickers also promised to supply Bolivia with its own Arsenal forWar Material

Manufacture that would produce 150,000 cartridges and 10,000shells per week. Finally, a

Bolivian team of five army officers, six army mechanics, threeto four airforce officers and

four airforce mechanics would go to Britain to train with thenew weapons.25 Although

Bolivia also negotiated with other companies such as koda26 ofCzechoslovakia, the Vickers

arms deal was the only major arms contract that Bolivia signedwith a foreign arms company

before or during the Chaco War. The Vickers deal emboldenedBolivia and without it war

was unlikely, indeed probably impossible, as without the Vickersarms Bolivia did not have

the matriel to fight anything other than brief border skirmishesin the Chaco.

There were, however, four problems with the arms that Boliviathought that it had acquired:

firstly, Vickers for various reasons never sent the full1,870,000-worth of equipment;

secondly, the matriel that did arrive was often of dubiousquality; thirdly, neighbouring

states such as Argentina and Chile blocked the trans-shipment ofVickers consignments that

had been shipped out for Bolivia; finally, the Bolivians wereunable to transport the matriel

that did arrive to the Chaco front because of a poor internaltransport system. This poor

logistical preparation helps to explain the defeat of theBolivian army in the Chaco in 1932

and 1933.

In December 1927, the Bolivians pressed Vickers to expedite thedelivery of the arms

promised over a year earlier.27 In 1928, the Bolivians presentedthe British Legation in La

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Paz with a long list detailing what Vickers had sent. Missingfrom the list was the Vickers

artillery that would be so important in any war. Shells hadarrived but no guns.28 By 1929,

due to financial constraints, Bolivia found that it was havingtrouble paying Vickers and the

Bolivian Minister of Finance went to America to try and floatanother loan with which to pay

the company. Moreover, the Bolivians had insufficient ammunitionwith which to fight any

large-scale conflict and the Bolivian pilots for the Vickerswarplanes were still untrained.29

With this in mind, in 1929, the Vickers arms deal was reduced to1,200,000 with, as the

British Foreign Office noted, a considerable amount of thesearms still undelivered.30 By

1930, of the 1,200,000 that was to be shipped out to Bolivia,458,000 was still

outstanding.31 It is unclear from the archival sources just howmuch of the original 1926 arms

contract was honoured, but from July 1932 to December 1934Bolivia received from Vickers

425,158 worth of arms from contracts dated as early as 1927 thatobviously had not been

fulfilled.32 It is apparent that Bolivia received a fractionprobably about a quarter, maybe a

third of the original 1926 deal and that much of the reducedfigure arrived too late to have

any effect on the battlefield performance of the Bolivian army.Even British Foreign Office

officials were not sure how much of the Vickers contract wasrealized, estimating in 1932

that war material to the value of 695,885 had been sent toBolivia, but I am unable to say

whether this is in fulfilment of the 1926 contract or of a laterone.33 As the correspondence

in the Vickers archive shows, the Bolivians, with warapproaching, complained repeatedly

about the delays in shipment, especially concerning theall-important artillery pieces that had

yet to arrive.34 In July 1931, a year before the outbreak of thewar, Vickers guns were still

being tested in Britain and were not ready for export.35 InSeptember 1932, by which time

Bolivia and Paraguay were engaged in full-scale hostilities, theBritish Legation in La Paz

hoped that the rest of the Vickers equipment will be ready toleave England by the end of

October.36

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There were also concerns regarding the quality of the matrielsent by Vickers, especially the

guns. Headed by Colonels Merino and Rivera, the Bolivian team inBritain struggled to sort

out mechanical problems with Vickers ordnance.37 The complaintsfrom the Bolivians about

the quality of the artillery rumbled on into 1931 and 1932,forcing Vickers to send out to

Bolivia a small team of mechanics led by Brigadier-General K.E.Haynes.38 The issue of poor

quality workmanship was apparent to the British Legation in LaPaz:

In view of the complaints that had been received as to theunsuitability of the material

supplied under this contract, Messrs. Vickers sent over towardsthe end of the year

[1930] a small commission headed by General Haynes to endeavourto settle the

differences which had arisen. It was admitted by Messrs. Vickersrepresentative that

certain of the material was not up to standard and perhaps notentirely suitable for use

in this country, but generally the cause was the ignorance ofthe Bolivian army

officers, and the lack of training in ordnance matters.39

The tiny Vickers team headed by Haynes was still testing andtinkering with non-functioning

guns and small arms in the field after the war started in 1932.Indeed, in November 1932, a

Major Briggs from Vickers who was unable to speak Spanish andwho was described by the

British Legation in La Paz as being totally out of his depth inBolivia was dispatched to the

Chaco front to try and help resolve the matter.40 The two sideswere still negotiating the issue

of broken equipment in May 1933, exactly the moment whenParaguay was fighting and

winning the major defensive battles of 1932-33 againstBolivia.41 Vickers argued that the

reason for the problems was not the quality of the matriel butshoddy maintenance by the

Bolivian army:

The whole bother with the Bolivians is their absolute want ofknowledge of every

technical detail of their equipment. Colonel Merino, who is here[in Britain], states

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they have had certain trouble with the recuperators [in theartillery pieces]. Of course

they have if they use soft soap and yellow grease in them; theyare bound to have

corrosion and all sorts of other trouble. Every nation that wesell these recuperators to,

who have proper technical staffs, have given us nothing butpraise.42

While training for Bolivian gunners was fairly basic about amonths training was provided

in 1932 there were also real problems with Vickers equipment.43Regardless of who was at

fault, in March 1933, the Bolivians sent back to Vickers inBritain 160 machine guns and 346

Vickers Berthier rifles for rectification.44 The same inventorynoted that only four out of

eight 105mm. field howitzers had been delivered; of twelve105mm. mountain howitzers only

four had been delivered; of forty-eight 75 mm. mountain gunsonly twenty-four had been

delivered; of thirty 65mm. infantry guns only six had beendelivered.45 Moreover, instead of

being on the high seas on their way to Bolivia, much of theundelivered artillery was still in

Britain and it would take months before it was ready to beshipped out to Bolivia. Financial

difficulties compounded Bolivias predicament as Vickersprevaricated on the repairs

promised, worried that Bolivia was unable to pay.46 The resultswere disastrous for the

Bolivian army fighting in the inhospitable and remote Chacoregion with seriously flawed

logistical support. Without a corps of mechanics, Bolivia wasforced to fight a war reliant

either on a reluctant Vickers workforce in Britain, or a handfulof Vickers-appointed British

military technicians working in the field trying to service aforeign army with alien traditions

and methods.47

Even when the arms were paid for and shipped-out to Bolivia,neighbouring states often held

up, tampered with or denied passage to the arms shipments. TheBolivians knew that they

were reliant on the goodwill of their neighbours for the passageof the Vickers arms being

shipped from Britain. The Bolivian government informed theBritish Legation in La Paz that

it was exercised in its mind as to by what route they couldreceive their arms from Vickers,

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being surrounded by neighbours whose feelings were not of thebest towards them, and

through whose territory the arms would have to pass. Theconclusion of the Under-Secretary

was that Chile would refuse passage through its port of Arica,Peru would steal portions of

any cargo going through its port of Mollendo, leaving onlyArgentina for trans-shipment.48

The best route for the import of any arms was, indeed, viaArgentina.49 In 1927, Vickers did

not anticipate any difficulty using Argentina.50 But by 1928 anincreasingly anxious Bolivia

was pressing the British government to facilitate the passage ofarms through Argentina, as

was noted by the British Legation in La Paz: Bolivian governmentare anxious to ensure safe

transit of armaments through the Argentine and have intimated tome that they would be

grateful if His Majestys Government could in any way smooth thepath for these armaments

of British manufacture. I replied that this was a very delicatematter but I would convey the

message.51 The Foreign Office reply, four days later, was towait on developments, adding:

Can it be because Bolivia is preparing to attack Paraguay?52

By 1929, both Argentina and Chile were obstructing the passageof Vickers arms destined for

Bolivia and the former had impounded some shipments, includingsome German arms

destined for Bolivia.53 Bolivia persisted in trying to use thebetter import routes of Argentina

and Chile but both states vacillated, making it impossible forBolivia to know whether any

given shipment would be allowed to pass or not. The Boliviansput pressure on Vickers who,

in turn, put pressure on the British Foreign Office to persuadethe Argentineans and Chileans.

This policy had some success but was time-consuming andimperfect, especially as the

Foreign Office was generally uninterested in helping Vickers,fearful of being accused of

helping to sustain a foreign war and aware that Vickers mainconcern in pushing for the

passage of arms was the fear that it might not get paid if thearms failed to arrive.54 By 1933,

matters came to a head, with Chile closing off the port ofArica, and Argentina using the

excuse of the formal declarations of war issued in 1933 to closeits ports and borders to

Bolivia.55 The closure of the border with Argentina wasespecially hard for Bolivia as it

11

relied on Argentina and the Argentinean railhead at Yacuiba notjust as a route for Vickers

imports but also for the passage of locally produced food andmedical supplies that were

needed for the Bolivian army in the southern Chaco (and theBolivian population generally).

Indeed, in the first few months of operations in 1932, theBolivian army in the Chaco would

probably have starved without help from across the border inArgentina.56 As Farcau rightly

concluded: .the Bolivian army had always calculated itslogistical requirements on the

assumption that it would be able to obtain food from just acrossthe Rio Pilcomayo in

Argentina.57 As for Chile, in February 1933, it was holding up300,000-worth of Vickers

consignments that had yet to be delivered.58 As the BritishEmbassy in Santiago wrote in

January 1933 concerning a Vickers shipment that had arrived inChile: This would, however,

be the last consignment of munitions of war which would beallowed to proceed to Bolivia

through Chilean territory. There was another consignment of1,200 cases on its way. The

Bolivian Minister would be informed today that it must bedeflected to some other port and

that all future consignments must be shipped through someterritory other than Chilean.59

In February 1933, the Bolivians were complaining that theclosure of Arica meant that they

were cut off from the outside world as Argentina was becomingimpossible to deal with and

Mollendo in Peru was unsuitable. Therefore, Bolivia was unableto take delivery of any more

Vickers equipment.60 In fact, Mollendo remained open, as theBolivians noted in April 1933,

but, by late 1933, it was the only major entrept for Boliviawith the wider world.61

Consequently, because of the difficulties with Argentina andChile, Bolivia asked Vickers to

send future shipments by way of Mollendo in Peru.62 This,however, was far from ideal as

passage via Mollendo usually meant that vital parts of armamentswent missing while on

transit through the port of Mollendo or on the Southern Railwayof the Peruvian Corporation

that snaked its way from Mollendo up to La Paz, the worldshighest capital city.63

12

The one remaining window with the outside world for Bolivia wasBrazil, a country willing

to provide trans-shipment facilities before and during the ChacoWar. In 1928, the Brazilian

Ministry of War had permitted the transit of Vickers munitionsof war from the Brazilian port

of Santos to the Bolivian border town of Puerto Surez in thenorthern Chaco.64 The route

was, however, a dead-end in that any arms delivered to PuertoSurez from Santos could go

no further as the Bolivians had no railway or metalled road ontheir side of the border.65

Moreover, Bolivias schwerpunkt in the Chaco War was in thesouth, in the area just north of

the Pilcomayo river, and it was impossible to move the arms atPuerto Surez from the minor

war zone in the northern Chaco to the main zone of fighting inthe south because of poor

internal communications within Bolivia. In effect, the Bolivianwar zones in the north and

south of the Chaco were discrete, and only the less importantone in the north could use

Brazils railway to the port of Santos. Thus, only a fraction ofthe Vickers arms went to

Puerto Surez, and that which did go there was only of use forfighting in the northern Chaco.

Neither were Bolivias roads and railways able to transport tothe Chaco the matriel that did

reach the country from abroad. To feed the main southern frontin the Chaco, the Bolivians

could use either the Argentinean railway line to Yacuiba or theTarija/Villazn66 railhead in

Bolivia; the railheads at Sucre or Arani supplied the northernfront. Taking Fortn Boquern

as the main point of fighting in the southern Chaco in 1932-33,the Yacuiba railhead, closed

by Argentina in 1933, was 250 miles in a straight line from thefront. Once Yacuiba was

closed, the Bolivians were left with the Villazn railhead,approximately 400 miles in a

straight line from the front, while in the north the railheadsat Sucre or Arani were some 500

miles from the northern front.67 Unpaved, dirt roads went fromthe railheads to Puerto Surez

in the north and Fort Muoz (and the 23rd parallel region) in thesouth, from whence lesser

feeder roads connected with the shifting front lines.68 As theLondon Times concluded, the

total distance from La Paz to the Chaco was 1000 miles, of whichonly 500 miles are

covered by rail. Over the remaining distance runs a narrow andbroken road, at first over high

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rocky plateaux, and then over wooded mountain slopes down to theflat plains of the Chaco

jungle.69 The assessment of the British Legation in La Paz wasthat the roads from the

railhead at Villazn to Villa Montes and Fort Muoz and beyondwere sandy and apparently

of little use for cars or lorries.Lorries and cars apparentlysink in the sand or else their

engines are ground out with the dust. The road between VillaMontes and Fort Muoz is said

to be strewn with wrecked cars and lorries and there is supposedto be a fifty-kilometre

stretch where motor cars cannot pass.70 The Bolivians hastysequestration of private cars

and the establishment of a chauffeurs corps did little toovercome the more fundamental

issue of a lack of a repair service for the automobiles forcedinto service on unsuitable

roads.71 In December 1932, a report from the La Paz Legation tothe Foreign Office spoke of

roads strewn with broken-down trucks and it was emphatic thatconditions of transport

between Tarija and Villa Montes must be appalling; automobilescannot be driven on account

of the depth of the sand.between Villa Montes and Muoz the roadcrosses the river twice

and the lorries must be taken over pontoon bridges; with theadvent of the rains72 and the

floods these will be impossible, and communication with Muoz canthen only be by air.73

The consequence of the breakdown in transport was that in July1932, at the start of the war,

the Bolivians were forced to leave behind in La Paz Vickers andSchneider guns that they

needed for the front, leaving their soldiers without thenecessary fire support for intense

battles against a determined, entrenched enemy.74

In 1928, the British Legation in La Paz estimated that Boliviantroops would have a two

weeks march across their own territory to get to the Chaco andthat Bolivias inordinately

long lines of communication gave Paraguay a distinct advantagein the Chaco.75 There was

also the question of the drop in altitude from 12,000 feet at LaPaz to 500 feet in the Chaco

that increased the wear and tear on both men and transportfacilities. By 1932, the estimate

for the journey to the front had improved: one-and-a-half daysby rail and two days by road to

Villa Montes, and a further three days on foot to Fort Muoz wasthe usual journey time.76

14

From Fort Muoz, however, it was still, at least in 1932-3, somedistance to the front line.

With the exception of limited supply runs by aeroplanes, oncethe railheads had been passed,

everything had to go by these unsuitable dirt roads as rivertransport via the Pilcomayo river

was impossible as it was not navigable to anything but thesmallest flat-bottomed craft. Not

only a physical but also a psychological distance separatedBolivia from the Chaco. The

average Bolivian had never been anywhere near the Chaco and hadnot the slightest

expectation of visiting it in the course of his life.77Moreover, the average Bolivian peasant

conscript, acclimatized to conditions on the high lands ofBolivia, suffered badly in the harsh

climate of the lowlands Chaco region.

Bolivias internal transport infrastructure simply could not bearthe weight of the Chaco War.

The Bolivians knew that their communications comparedunfavourably to those of the

Paraguayans78 but, as with the arms imports, a curious optimismperhaps fatalism is a better

word drove on their army. Outside military observers commentedon the poor staff work of

the Bolivians, the improvisation, extemporization and generallack of planning, but, above

all, It was an army with troops, but no service.79 Theconsequence of the poor logistical

preparation was that, from June 1932 to July 1933, Paraguay wasable to check Bolivias

initial assault at the battles of Boquern, Toledo and Nanawa,before going on the offensive,

in late 1933 and 1934, capturing Fort Muoz, Picuiba and CaadaStrongest, and driving the

Bolivians from all the Chaco by 1935.

Paraguay

The interest in Bolivias Vickers deal rather overshadowsParaguays attempts at buying

arms. Paraguay began acquiring foreign arms from the French firmSchneider in 1921 and

thereafter embarked on a clever multi-source arms buyingstrategy that would take it to

victory in the Chaco War.80 Notwithstanding the abject povertyin which most Paraguayans

lived, in 1922, Paraguay spent some $200,000 in gold on arms,worth approximately

15

40,000.81 As Zook noted, the turning point for Paraguay came in1925 when its President,

Eligio Ayala, launched a program of arms acquisition forParaguay designed to equip a

modern army of 24,000 with the latest equipment.82 Zooksestimate was that Paraguay paid

$4,730,733 for arms from 1926 to 1932, a figure that representedsome 60% of Paraguays

national income, and one confirmed by Spanish-language secondarysources.83 The Bolivian

estimate was that Paraguay in 1931-32 was spending 32% of itstotal income on its army.84

The plan was to create a 24-30,000-strong army: four combatgroups of 5820 men each with

organic engineers, artillery, etc.85 According to Zook,Paraguays arms contracts in 1926-27

in Europe exceeded $2,000,000 and included rifles, pistols,sabres, ammunition, 24

Schneider 75 mm. guns, shells, aircraft engines, 7 Wilbaultpursuit planes, 7 Potez 25s,

saddles, blankets, uniform equipment, mule harnesses, tents, andthe like.86 Also included

were two Italian-built gunboats, 7,000 Belgian Mausers, 200Madsen automatic rifles,

ammunition and 24 Stokes-Brandt mortars (the mortars costing$67,581).87

If Zook over-estimated Bolivias deal with Vickers, heunder-estimated the scale of

Paraguays arms buying. Marcial Samiengo used the ParaguayanMinistry of Defence archive

in Asuncin (the Departamento de Archivo del Ministerio deDefensa Nacional) for his book

entitled Las FF. [Fuerzas] AA. [Armadas] de la Nacin en elDecenio de la Pre-Guerra del

Chaco hasta la Victoria de Boquern (1979). In it, he shows thatParaguay was thinking of

buying arms from 1923 but the key turning point was ExecutiveOrder 21.211 of 29 July

1925 dated 9 July by Jorge Antezana Villagrn88 that authorizedthe expenditure of

1,810,000 gold pesos, equivalent to 348,715, on arms acquisitionin Europe.89 However, the

actual sum expended on arms greatly exceeded this total.Samiengo records that by 1932

Paraguay had spent $5,926,890 on arms equivalent to a sum ofbetween 1,227,354 and

1,244,677 and, using the relevant government files, he detailsthe purchases that make up

this figure.90 This total of almost 1,250,000 comparesfavourably to the c.400,000-worth of

often poor-quality Vickers equipment that eventually found itsway to Bolivia.

16

The Ministry of Defence archive in Asuncin confirms the extentof Paraguays arms buying

strategy both in terms of money spent and matriel purchased. TheParaguayans appointed

General Manlio Schenoni to head up their arms-buying team thatwent to Europe in the late

1920s. When Schenoni came home in 1929, to become Minister ofDefence, his team, based

in Belgium, remained in Europe, helped by the ArgentineanGeneral Manuel Costa of the

Comisin Tcnica Argentina de Adquisiciones en el Extranjero.91The range of European

and American arms companies used by Paraguay is impressive. In1926, the Paraguayans

bought $300,756-worth of Mauser rifles and cartridges fromSpains Fbrica Nacional de

Oviedo and 176 Madsen machine guns from Denmarks DanskRekylriffel Syndicat valued at

47,775 (worth some $230,000).92 After 1927 the arms buyingincreased exponentially and,

from 1927 to 1932, the Paraguayans, led by Schenoni, negotiatedfor multiple orders of

military equipment from America, Argentina, Belgium, Britain,Chile, Denmark, France,

Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.93Seiferheld lists thirty-three

contracts from February 1927 to February 1929.94 This isprobably an understatement. The

range of orders placed and companies used was extensive, as thefollowing indicative list

shows:

In February 1927, the Paraguayans signed a contract with theBelgian tablissem*nts Jules Fonson of Brussels for 400 cavalrysabres;95

In February-March 1927, the Paraguayans bought eleven million7.65 mm. Mauser cartridges from Fabrique Nationale dArmes de Guerreof Lige;96

In April 1927, the Paraguayans bought from the same FabriqueNationale dArmes de Guerre 304 Browning pistols and 25,000cartridges;97

In August 1927, Schenoni bought military clothing from theSpanish as the Paraguayan army was changing its uniforms from khakito green to match the terrain

of the Chaco;98

17

In 1927-28, the Paraguayans negotiated with the Dutch company,Nederlandsche Instrumenten Compagnie of Venlo, for range-findingequipment (Telmetros) for

their artillery;99

On 26 March 1928, Schenoni was in Germany buying equipment,including clothing and saddles, a trip for which he spent$77,000;100

On 6 November 1928, the Paraguayans bought 15,759 of uniformsfrom Germany (equivalent to $77,000) with the Bank of Englandproviding the finance and

transferring the money;101

From 1927-29, the Paraguayans bought Colt weaponry from ColtPatent Firearm Company of USA (and shipped to Paraguay throughBuenos Aires);102

On 7 January 1929, Schenoni was back in Denmark at the DanskRekylriffel Syndicat Copenhagen buying more Danish Madsen automaticweaponry;103

From 1930-31, the Paraguayans bought aerial photographyequipment (that could be used for map-making) and binoculars fromthe French; also Schneider-supplied rifles

and cartridges from France;104

On 17 January 1931, the Fabrique Nationale dArmes de Guerre ofLige recorded that the Paraguayans had $134,634 (27,880) yet topay, with $177,414 (36,739)

already paid.105

The Paraguayans drained their economy to raise the hard currencyneeded to pay for these

arms, including, in 1929, an internal loan of 470,000 (100million Paraguayan pesos), 70%

of which was used to buy arms.106 The result was a thoroughpreparation for war that, while

it caused some difficulties in terms of equipmentstandardization, overcame the potential

problem of one arms company dispatching poor-quality equipment.The policy adopted by

the Paraguayans allowed them to buy the best from each Europeancountry and meant that

they could play one company off against another to get what theywanted at the best price.

18

Having wisely sourced their arms abroad, Paraguay had threeadditional advantages over the

Bolivians: firstly, Paraguays neighbours, notably Argentina,trans-shipped matriel before

and during the Chaco War; secondly, it established a workableinternal transport network to

take matriel to the Chaco front; finally, Paraguay madeintelligent use of local Mennonite

communities in the Chaco to help its war effort.

Argentina was the key state for the import of arms to Paraguay.Its position vis--vis

Paraguay was neatly summed up in a British Legation annualreport from La Paz that

compared the Chaco War to Europe in 1914 with Paraguay asSerbia, Bolivia as Austria-

Hungary and Argentina as Russia.107 Fearful of Bolivianexpansionist claims in the region,

and seeing Paraguay as a vassal state, Argentina providedParaguay with consistent support

before and during the Chaco War. Not only did imported armsenjoy free passage on

Argentinean rivers and railways that connected with Paraguay,Argentina also supplied

Paraguay with arms and munitions from its arsenals and helpedwith political and military

advice.108 Argentina provided the arms free or on veryfavourable financial terms.109 It also

gave Paraguay the use of various domestic facilities such as theCrdoba aircraft factory in

Argentina that repaired the motors of Bolivian warplanes downedin the Chaco so that the

Paraguayans could reuse them.110 Meanwhile, the Argentinean armydeployed on the right

bank of the Pilcomayo river, ostensibly for reasons of nationalsecurity, but this served as a

flank protection for the Paraguayan army and simultaneouslyexposed the Bolivian flank.111

The help afforded by Argentina was not lost on local diplomaticstaff. In August 1932, the

British Charg dAffaires in Asuncin wrote to the Buenos AiresEmbassy:

More important, however, is the fact, which seems to beundoubted, that Paraguay has

been drawing supplies of war material, including ammunition,from the Argentine

arsenals, and I have even been assured that Paraguay haspractically carte blanche to

19

draw thereon whatever she may require. There is no doubt thatgoods consigned to the

Paraguayan Government have arrived both by rail and by river notappearing on any

manifest, while other material arrives in even less orthodoxfashion from unnamed

places in Argentina, on the opposite bank of the RiverPilcomayo. The concentration

of Argentine troops on the southern bank of the Pilcomayo, whichis also reported, is,

of course, quite legitimate in order to maintain Argentineneutrality. It is expected,

however, that this neutrality will be extremely benevolent asfar as Paraguay is

concerned.112

Not only did equipment pour into Paraguay from the south butArgentinean air force pilots

were also said to have been allowed to retire temporarily sothat they could fly for

Paraguay.113 The Argentineans even helped in the field ofintelligence, with the Argentinean

Legation in La Paz providing Paraguay with the keys to Boliviangeneral staff ciphers. This

act is said to have been a determining factor in Paraguayanmilitary successes in the Chaco in

1934.114

While Chile was unable to provide Paraguay with the same levelof direct support as

Argentina, its long-standing dispute with Bolivia over itsnorthern littoral around the town of

Arica, which Bolivia had lost in the nineteenth century andwanted back, meant that its

sympathies lay with Paraguay.115 Certainly, strategy dictatedthat Chile provide support for

Paraguay against a potential enemy keen to gain access to thesea be it through Paraguay or

Chile. After all, if Bolivia gained an outlet to the sea in theArica desert region, Chile would

lose the profitable and politically influential control that ithad over Bolivia. Finally, even

Brazil and Uruguay seem to have helped Paraguay. 116

Matriel that arrived in Paraguay from Argentina came either viathe Paran and Paraguay

rivers or by Argentinean railways to the southern Paraguayantown of Encarnacin on the

20

Paran river. The river route was capable of taking large shipsas far as Asuncin. The

Central Railway of Paraguay (the Ferrocarril Central delParaguay), completed in 1909, with

a link with Argentina established in 1913 by a ferry-boatservice across the Paran river at

Encarnacin, took goods into Paraguay to the terminus atAsuncin.117 Using either the

railway or the river network, goods could be brought viaArgentina quickly and safely to

Asuncin. From the Paraguayan capital, men and matriel for theChaco front were then

dispatched by ship up the Paraguay river. In 1926, Paraguay hadbeen careful to order from

Italy two 750-ton monitors, both of which arrived in 1931.118These warships, the Caonero

Paraguay and Caonero Humait, provided the next link in Paraguayslogistical system, and

were part of a naval expansion program that saw an increase innaval personnel from 650 in

1925 to 10,000 in 1935.119 Supplemented by the Paraguayanmerchant fleet, five cargo

vessels and two passenger ships converted to hospital ships, theParaguay and Humait

ferried the Paraguayan army in speed and comfort to PuertoCasado, upriver from the

Paraguayan capital, each ship capable of taking a full battalionof men.

Unlike Bolivia, Paraguay had a railway network in the Chaco. Intotal, five private narrow-

gauge railways, with a combined length of 425 kms (266 miles),stretched out west into the

Chaco from the banks of the Paraguay at the following riverports: Puerto Casado (160 kms

or 100 miles), Puerto Pinasco (130 kms or 81 miles), PuertoSastre (90 kms or 56 miles) and

smaller lines at Puerto Guaran and Puerto Palma Chica.120 Theselines had been built to

exploit the resources of the Chaco, in particular the Quebrachoaxe breaker tree used for the

production of tannin. Once the war started, the Paraguayangovernment rented the Chaco

railways from the private logging companies. The railway atPuerto Casado, that stretched

100 miles into the Chaco, was the main line used by theParaguayan army. Troops from

Asuncin, ferried up river to Puerto Casado, would make thejourney into the Chaco by rail.

From the railhead, it was a short 70 kms (44 mile) march to IslaPoi, the central base for the

Paraguayan army in the Chaco.121 This became a rapid means ofmoving around men and

21

equipment. For example, Estigarribia, the Paraguayan commander,was able to leave his

GHQ at Villa Militar in the central Chaco and, travelling byrail to Puerto Casado and then

ship up the Paraguay river, reach Baha Negra in the far north ofParaguay early in the

morning of the next day.122 Obviously, as a senior commanderEstigarribia had priority on

travel but the speed with which he moved from one war zone toanother suggests that

Paraguay had a flexible and efficient internal transport system.All of the key battles of 1932

and 1933 were fought within a reasonable distance of the PuertoCasado railhead, giving the

Paraguayans a logistical edge over their Bolivian opponents.

The final factor working in Paraguays favour was the presence inthe central Chaco of

friendly settler colonies of Protestant (Anabaptist) Mennonites.There are now three

Mennonite colonies in the Chaco, with the town of Filadelfia astheir administrative centre.

The first colony arrived from Canada in 1926 and establishedColonia Menno at Loma Plata

in April 1928; the second colony was established bySoviet/Russian settlers at Fernheim from

1930 to 1932; the third colony at Neuland was established afterthe Chaco War in 1947.123 In

July 1925, the Paraguayan parliament passed Law 514 that grantedthe Mennonites a

Privilegium exempting them from military service and giving themlocal religious and civil

autonomy. Following the passing of Law 514, there came a mostcordial invitation to the

Mennonites to make Paraguay their home and Mennonites fromCanada and the Soviet

Union, whose way-of-life was under threat, subsequently moved tothe Chaco.124 For the

Paraguayans, the Mennonites represented a hard-working frontiersettler community that

would help them stake their claim to a wilderness area inhabitedonly by indigenous peoples.

The irony was that the Paraguayans were using the pacifistMennonites as their weapon to

secure the Chaco: Mennonite ploughshares would function asswords.125 The advantage

for the Paraguayans extended beyond that of staking a claim tothe Chaco: the heavy fighting

in 1932-33 in the Chaco occurred just to the south of the LomaPlata and Fernheim colonies

and the agriculturally minded Mennonites supplied the Paraguayanarmy with various fresh

22

foodstuffs, thus supplementing the cattle brought on the hooffor the army.126 While the

Chaco War was a dangerous time for the Mennonites munitions andbody parts from the

Chaco War are still being turned up by Mennonite farmers, someof which is deposited in the

Museo Unger in Filadelfia it was also a beneficial period as theParaguayan army was a

local market for their surplus food production.127 As with thearms-buying strategy initiated

in 1925, the Paraguayans were pro-active and forward-thinking insettling the Chaco with

Mennonites, providing for themselves a local source to help withlogistics.128 The Bolivians

tried to start a similar scheme with 400 German settler familiesbefore the First World War

but before they could settle the Chaco the Great War broke outand the scheme collapsed.129

Conclusion

While Paraguays victory in the Chaco War was a function of acombination of factors, as

this article has attempted to show, better preparation andplanning for war were key dynamics

that facilitated the triumph of a financially and economicallyweak state over its larger

Bolivian adversary with its German-trained and British-equippedarmy. When full-scale war

started in 1932, Paraguay had the logistical train in place tofight a long war. Its shrewd

policy of multi-sourced arms buying before the war provided theright mix of weaponry that

equipped the men who went rapidly by river, rail and foot to theChaco front. Although land-

locked, throughout the conflict, Paraguay kept open itsinternational supply lines through

Argentina, allowing it to nourish its army in the defensivebattles of 1932-33 and then build

up its forces for the grand offensive of 1934-35. Bolivia,meanwhile, had been poorly served

by the Vickers company, whose arms never arrived in sufficientquantity or quality to allow

its army to overcome the disadvantage of fighting at the end ofridiculously over-extended

supply lines with few local allies willing to provide thetransit facilities for the importing of

the matriel needed for a long war. Victory and defeat in theChaco War was the result of a

combination of reasons but logistics was a key element in this,and the Bolivians misplaced

hope that their German-trained army would be able quickly toovercome the smaller

23

Paraguayan reinforces the old maxim: amateurs talk tactics,professionals talk logistics. Or,

as Field Marshal Erwin Rommel put it, the battle is fought anddecided by the quartermasters

before the shooting begins.130

1 For help in the production of this article the author wouldlike to thank: Enriqueta Garrido of University

College Northampton; Colonel Agustin Olmedo Alvarenga, Directorof the Instituto de Historia y Museo

Militar, Asuncin; Ramn Flores Gaona, Deputy Director of theInstituto de Historia y Museo Militar,

Asuncin; Lieutenant Rafael Alberto Ruiz Ferreira, Ministerio deDefensa Nacional, Asuncin; the staff of the

Museo Histrico Boquern, Fortn Boquern, Gobernacin de Boquern,Paraguay; the staff of the Museo

Unger, Filadelfia, Paraguay; the staff of the Departamento deArchivo del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional,

Asuncin; the Vickers Archive, Cambridge University Library, forpermission to reproduce material from the

Vickers papers; the British Petroleum Archive, University ofWarwick, for permission to quote from its

collection; Paul Ledvina and the Public Affairs Section ofExxonMobil (formerly Standard Oil Company New

Jersey), USA; and Veronica Davies and the staff of the ShellGroup Archive, London. Crown copyright material

in the National Archives London (incorporating the PublicRecords Office) is reproduced by permission of the

Controller of Her Majestys Stationery Office.

2 Paul H. Lewis, Paraguay since 1930, The Cambridge History ofLatin America. Latin America since 1930.

Spanish South America, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991), 8: 234; Paul

Robinson, Forgotten Victors: White Russian Officers in Paraguayduring the Chaco War, 1932-5, The Journal

of Slavic Military History 12/3 (September 1999): 178.

3 For information on the foreign military missions, see Extractof Report on Paraguay by Acting Consul F. W.

Paris (Asuncin), 10 January 1920, in FO 371/4542, f.9, NationalArchives London (formerly the Public

Records Office) [hereafter NA]; War Office to Under Secretary ofState at Foreign Office, 24 August 1920, in

FO 371/4429, f.393, NA; British Legation Santiago to Curzon, 25February 1921, in FO 371/5532, f.213, NA;

Frederick M. Nunn, Yesterdays Soldiers: European MilitaryProfessionalism in South America, 1890-1940

(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 304-5;and Robinson, Forgotten Victors, 178,

180.

4 Pierre Mondain, La guerre du Chaco: Paraguay contre Bolivie(1932-35), Revue Historique 267/1 (January-

March 1982): 43.

5 See also David Lewis Jones, Paraguay: A Bibliography (New Yorkand London: Garland, 1979), 171-190, and

R. Andrew Nickson, Paraguay (Oxford: Clio, 1999).

24

6 Bruce W. Farcau, The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932-35(Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1996)

and David H. Zook The Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven, CT:Bookman, 1960). Zooks volume was

translated into Spanish as La conduccin de la Guerra del Chaco(Buenos Aires: Policarpo Artaza, 1962).

7 Delma Sejas de Torrico and Beatriz Bozo Jivaja, Bibliografatema Guerra del Chaco (La Paz: Honorable

Senado Nacional Biblioteca del Congreso, 1996).

8 Of this total of 350 many are multiple copies of the samebook.

9 G. H. N. Larden, The Chaco War, Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute 79 (1934): 139-44; Adrian

English, The Chaco War, Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 109/3(1979): 350-58; Ronald Stuart Kain,

Behind the Chaco War, Current History (August 1935): 468-74; J.W. Lindsay, The War over the Chaco,

International Affairs 14/2 (March-April 1935): 231-240;Robinson, Forgotten Victors, 178-185; John Hoyt

Williams, The Chaco War, 1932-35, Strategy and Tactics 110(1986): 7-10; Mondain, La guerre du Chaco,

43-64; Yves Salkin, Action des attachs et conseillers militairesfranais en Amerique Latine de 1919 1940,

Mondes et Cultures 46/3 (1986): 521-30; Bohumil Badura,eskoslovensk zbrane a diplomacie ve vlce o

Gran Chaco, Sbornk historick 24 (1976): 137-185; and Tom Jirnek,eskoslovenst dustojnci ve vlce o

Gran Chaco, Historie a vojenstv 43/4 (1994): 40-49.

10 Such as Julio Jos Chiavenato, La Guerra del Chaco: petrleo(Asuncin: Schauman, 1989). First published

in Portuguese as Guerra do Chaco (leia-se petrleo) (So Paolo:Editoria Brasiliense, 1979).

11 For military accounts, see Roberto Querejazu [or Queregazu]Calvo, Masamaclay: historia, poltica y militar

de la Guerra del Chaco (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro,1975); Roberto Querejazu [or Queregazu]

Calvo, Historia de la Guerra del Chaco (La Paz: LibreraEditorial Juventud, 1990); Demetrio Canelas, La

guerra del Chaco: documentos (Cochabamba, Bolivia: EditorialCanelas, 1987); Pedro Medina, La Guerra del

Chaco (Asuncin: Direccin de Publicaciones de las FF AA NN, 1985)two volumes; Salustio Selaya Pelez,

Documentos y Memorias de la Guerra del Chaco (La Paz: EmpresaEditora Urquizo, 1972); Guido Chase Sardi,

La guerra del Chaco: preparacin militar del Paraguay antes de laGuerra (Asuncin: Editora Litocolor SRL,

1992-6); Jorge Antezana Villagrn, La Guerra del Chaco: anlisis ycrtica sobre la conduccin militar (La

Paz: Editorial Calama, 1981-2), two volumes; Luis Vittone, Laguerra del Chaco (Paraguay[?]: n.p., 1986[?]),

three volumes. For wider aspects to the war, see Elio M. A.Colle, El drama del Paraguay (Buenos Aires:

Editorial Claridad, 1936); Justo Rodas Eguino, La Guerra delChaco: interpretacin de poltica internacional

americana (Buenos Aires: Bernabe, 1938); and Alfredo M.Seiferheld, Economa y petrleo durante la Guerra

del Chaco (Asuncin: Instituto Paraguayo de Estudios Geopolticose Internacionales, 1983).

25

12 First translated by Pablo Max Ynsfran, ed., The Epic of theChaco: Marshal Estigarribias Memoirs of the

Chaco War, 1932-35 (Austin: University of Texas Press, Instituteof Latin American Studies, Latin American

Studies 8, 1950).

13 Ynsfran, ed., The Epic of the Chaco, 14.

14 In English, see Michael Gillette, Huey Long and the ChacoWar, Louisiana History 11/4 (1970): 293-311;

Herbert S. Klein, American Oil Companies in Latin America: TheBolivian Experience, Inter-American

Economic Affairs, 18/2 (Autumn 1964): 47-72; and Standard OilCompany of Bolivia, Confiscation: A History

of the Oil Industry in Bolivia (New York: Standard Oil Companyof Bolivia, 1939). In Spanish, see Chiavenato,

La Guerra del Chaco and Seiferheld, Economa y petrleo. The dustjacket of Pelezs Documentos y Memorias

has an image of three oil derricks above some oil storage tanksnext to a hand holding a rifle, a reflection of the

unproven assumption that the Chaco War was fought over thesupposed oil deposits of the Chaco.

15 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallersteinto Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1977), 1.

16 Richard Holmes, ed., The Oxford Companion to Military History(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),

513.

17 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on thePrivate Manufacture of and Trading in Arms.

First day (1 May 1935) in Royal Commission on the PrivateManufacture of and Trading in Arms (1935-36)

Report (London: HMSO, 1936), 4, 12-3, in Royal Commission on thePrivate Manufacture of and Trading in

Arms. Evidence Submitted, Findings of Commission and DocumentsCompiled at London Office for the Use of

the Witnesses of the Vickers Group, 1935-1936, in File 60,Vickers papers, Cambridge University Library

[hereafter CUL]. See also Margaret Le Foy, The Chaco Dispute andthe League of Nations (dissertation, 1941;

published, Ann Arbor, MI: Edward Brothers, 1946), 80; Editorial,Feeders of War, The Spectator (18 May

1934): 764-5; and League of Nations. Dispute between Bolivia andParaguay. Report of the Chaco Commission

1934, C.154.M.64.1934.VII.1, 28, 54, 57.

18 For clashes in 1921, see FO 371/5574, ff.100-106, NA; forclashes in 1927, see William L. Schurz, The

Chaco Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, Foreign Affairs 7,1/4 (1928-29): 654.

19 War Office (M12) Assessment entitled Appreciation of thesituation between Bolivia and Paraguay, 27 July

1928, in FO 371/12730, NA.

20 Wiswould (Department of Overseas Trade) to Torr (FO), 9January 1928, in FO 371/12738, NA; Michell

(British Legation La Paz) to Austen Chamberlain, 5 January 1928,in FO 371/12738, NA.

21 Farcau, Chaco War, 20; Zook, Conduct, 48. The 1.25 millionfigure is corroborated in FO 371/13451, f.97,

NA.

26

22 League of Nations. Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay.Memorandum from the Bolivian Government

dated 12 February 1934 and Memorandum from the ParaguayanDelegation dated 8 March 1934. 11 June

1934 (C.255.M.104.1934.VII.5), 9.

23 British Legation La Paz to Austen Chamberlain (FO), 3 May1926, in FO 371/11114, ff.5-6, NA.

24 Michell (La Paz) to FO, 2 October 1926, in FO 371/11114,f.14, NA. Some British Foreign Office

correspondence gives the date for the contract as the 7 October1926.

25 Copy of agreement made between Messrs. Vickers Ltd. and theBolivian government for a supply of

armaments, [October 1926], in FO 371/11114, ff.31-60, NA.

26 War Office (M12) Assessment entitled Appreciation of thesituation between Bolivia and Paraguay, 27 July

1928, in FO 371/12730, NA.

27 FO to Scott (Santiago), 16 December 1927, in FO 371/11962,f.258, NA.

28 Bolivian Ministry of War to Michell (British Legation LaPaz), 20 October 1928, in FO 371/12741, ff.208-9,

NA.

29 Robertson (British Legation La Paz) to Austen Chamberlain(FO), 18 May 1929, in FO 371/13465, ff.28-9,

NA.

30 Minute/note by T. M. Snow (FO) on Memorandum onParaguay-Bolivia border clash, 22 November 1929, in

FO 371/13451, f.97, NA.

31 Fountain (Board of Trade) to Under-Secretary of State (FO),19 February 1930, in FO 371/14197, f.13, NA.

32 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on thePrivate Manufacture of and Trading in Arms.

Thirteenth and Fourteenth days. 8-9 January 1936 in RoyalCommission on the Private Manufacture of and

Trading in Arms (1935-36) Report (London: HMSO, 1936) 425-6,appendix 15, in Royal Commission on the

Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms. Evidence Submitted,Findings of Commission and Documents

Compiled at London Office for the Use of the Witnesses of theVickers Group, 1935-1936, in File 60, Vickers

papers, CUL.

33 Memorandum by Kelly (FO) 17 May 1932, in FO 371/15788,ff.76-8, NA.

34 See the correspondence in File (microfilm) NB K606, VickersArchive, CUL.

35 Correspondence in File (microfilm) NB K606/190ff, VickersArchive, CUL.

36 Vaughan (British Legation La Paz) to John Simon (FO) 30September 1932, in FO 371/15789, ff.291-303,

NA.

37 Letter dated 20 October 1930, in File (microfilm) NBK606/115, Vickers Archive, CUL.

38 See the correspondence in File (microfilm) NB K606/122ff,Vickers Archive, CUL

27

39 Hobson (La Paz) to Henderson (FO) enclosing Annual PoliticalReport on Bolivia for 1930, 19 March 1931,

in FO 371/15058, f.201, NA.

40 Major F. W. Briggs (La Paz) to Vickers GB, 3 November 1932,in File (microfilm) NB K606/312-6, Vickers

Archive, CUL. For Briggss inability to speak Spanish andcomments generally, see Nosworthy (British

Minister, British Legation, La Paz) to Birch (UK), 14 November1933, in File (microfilm) NB K607/15-18,

Vickers Archive, CUL.

41 In File (microfilm) NB K606/410-12, Vickers Archive, CUL

42 Birch (UK) to Nosworthy (British Minister, British Legation,La Paz), 31 July 1933, in File (microfilm) NB

K607/6, Vickers Archive, CUL.

43 Vaughan (British Legation La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 30September 1932, in FO 371/15789, ff.291-303,

NA.

44 Bolivian Contract Position as at 27 March 1933, in File(microfilm) NB K606/351-7, Vickers Archive, CUL.

45 Ibid.

46 Notes of Conversation with Urriolagoitia by Wonfor, 31 March1933, in File (microfilm) NB K606/358-9

(and correspondence thereafter), Vickers Archive, CUL.

47 Vaughan (British Legation La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 30September 1932, in FO 371/15789, ff.291-303,

NA.

48 Michell (British Legation, La Paz) to Austen Chamberlain(FO), 27 October 1927, in FO 371/11962, ff.260-3,

NA.

49 Colonel Russell [?], Military Attach to British Ambassador(British Embassy Rio de Janeiro), 18 August

1928, in FO 371/12730, NA; G. Nemsley (Vickers-Armstrong) toDirector, Export Licensing Section, Board of

Trade, 17 February 1928, in FO 371/12741, f.192, NA.

50 FO to Robertson (Embassy Buenos Aires), 27 October 1927, inFO 371/11961, f.240, NA. For use of

Argentinean route, see also Materials Shipped to Bolivia, 1928,in File (microfilm) NB K606/32-4, Vickers

Archive, CUL.

51 Michell (La Paz) to FO, 17 January 1928, in FO 371/12738,NA

52 FO to Michell (La Paz), 21 January 1928, in FO 371/12738,NA

53 Minister in Paraguay (Kreeck) to the Secretary of State, 5January 1929, in Papers Relating to the Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1929 (Washington, DC: USGovernment Printing Office, 1943) 1: 834.

54 Noel Birch to Colonel Neilson and Commander Craven, 14February 1933, in File (microfilm) NB K606/331-

2, Vickers Archive, CUL. See also Wonfor to Noel Birch, 13February 1933, in File (microfilm) NB K606/334,

Vickers Archive, CUL.

28

55 Letter to Noel Birch of Vickers, 25 January 1933, in File(microfilm) NB K606/329, Vickers Archive, CUL.

56 Larden, Chaco War, 140.

57 Farcau, Chaco War, 124.

58 Letter entitled Bolivian Shipments, Bridge [?] to Birch, 13February 1933, in File (microfilm) NB K606/335-

6, Vickers Archive, CUL; Birch to Foreign Office, 14 February1933, in File (microfilm) NB K606/346 (copy in

FO 371/16545, f.117, NA), Vickers Archive, CUL.

59 British Embassy (Santiago) to John Simon (FO) 26 January1933, in FO 371/16545, ff.112-3, NA.

60 Wonfor to Noel Birch, 13 February 1933, in File (microfilm)NB K606/334, Vickers Archive, CUL.

61 Bentincto (Lima) to FO, 13 April 1933, in FO 371/16545,f.156, NA.

62 Memorandum by T. M. Snow (FO), 31 January 1929, in FO371/13465, ff.6-9, NA; see also correspondence

from 1928 in File (microfilm) NB K606, Vickers Archive, CUL.

63 Michell (British Legation La Paz) to Austen Chamberlain (FO)22 February 1929, in FO 371/13465, ff.24-6,

NA.

64 B. Alston (Rio de Janeiro) to FO, 16 August 1928, in FO371/12738. See also Colonel Russell [?], Military

Attach to British Ambassador (British Embassy Rio de Janeiro),18 August 1928, in FO 371/12730, NA.

65 The appalling communications in the northern Chaco aredetailed in Julian Duguid, Green Hell: Chronicle of

Travel in the Forests of Eastern Bolivia (London: Jonathan Cape,1931).

66 The railhead seems to have been at Villazn but some mapsextend it to Tarija: Mapa general de la

Repblica de Bolivia. Edicion auspiciada por: Sociedad deIngenieros de Bolivia Centro de Propaganda y

Defensa Nacional Sociedad Geogrfica de La Paz. 1936, in FO925/12365, NA.

67 Ibid. See also the map entitled Las Comunicaciones de Boliviacon el Atlntico y con el Pacfico, in FO

371/15789, f.275, NA on which the nearest railhead for the Chacois at Arani.

68 Memorandum by Burbury (FO), 28 January 1928, in FO 371/13540,ff.162-5, NA.

69 The Chaco War. Battles of Hide and Seek. A Story from theFront Line, The Times, (28 October 1933).

70 Vaughan (British Legation La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 30September 1932, in FO 371/15789, ff.291-303,

NA.

71 Ibid..

72 The rainy season in the Chaco extends from January toJune.

73 R. L. Nosworthy (La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 21 December1932, in FO 371/16519, NA.

74 Vaughan (British Legation La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 30September 1932, in FO 371/15789, ff.291-303,

NA (discussing the report dated July 1932).

29

75 Michell (La Paz British Legation) to FO, 22 July 1928, in FO371/12730, NA; Robertson (Buenos Aires) to

Austen Chamberlain (FO), 19 December 1928, in FO 371/13465,ff.53-60, NA.

76 Vaughan (British Legation La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 30September 1932, in FO 371/15789, ff.291-303,

NA.

77 Nosworthy (La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 14 April 1932, in FO371/15788, ff.83-7, NA.

78 Tottenham Smith (British Legation Asuncin) to Macleay (BuenosAires), 8 October 1932, in FO 371/15789,

ff.280-5, NA.

79 Nosworthy (La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 21 December 1932, inFO 371/16519, NA.

80 Internal Political Situation in Paraguay, Report forSeptember 1921, enclosed in Paris (Asuncin Legation)

Despatch No.28, 8 October 1921, in FO 371/5604, ff.72-6, NA.

81 Internal Political Situation in Paraguay, Report for November1922, enclosed in Paris (Asuncin Legation)

Despatch No.55, 5 December 1922, in FO 371/8476, ff.3-4, NA.

82 Zook, Conduct, 45.

83 Ibid., 63, 66-7. For Spanish-language sources, see Calvo,Masamaclay, 177 and Villagrn, La Guerra de

Chaco, 96.

84 League of Nations. Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay.Statement of the Bolivian Governments case

Communicated in Virtue of Article 15, Paragraph 2, of theCovenant (Geneva: League of Nations Publication

Department, 1934), 1934.VII.9, 24-5.

85 Zook, Conduct, 67.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Villagrn, La Guerra de Chaco, 1: 96.

89 Marcial Samiengo, Las FF. [Fuerzas] AA. [Armadas] de la Nacinen el Decenio de la Pre-Guerra del Chaco

hasta la Victoria de Boquern (Asuncin: Imprenta Militar, 1979),92. The author is grateful to the Business

History Unit of the London School of Economics and PoliticalScience (LSE) for help in converting the gold

peso figure to pounds sterling.

90 Original statistics from Samiengo, Las FF. AA. de la Nacin enel Decenio de la Pre-Guerra del Chaco, 107.

The lower pound sterling figure is the one provided by the Bankof England Information Centre; the slightly

higher figure is the one provided by the Business History Unitof the LSE.

91 Samiengo, Las FF. AA. de la Nacin en el Decenio de laPre-Guerra del Chaco, 92.

30

92 Seiferheld, Economa y petrleo, 36. For more on the deals withDansk Rekylriffel Syndicat, see Tottenham-

Smith (Asuncin) to Macleay (Buenos Aires), 28 December 1932, inFO 371/16519, ff.90-1, NA. For lower

figures than Seiferheld, see Villagrn, La Guerra de Chaco,96.

93 See archival sources listed below in Dpto. de Archivo delMinisterio de Defensa Nacional, Asuncin

[hereafter MDN]; Seiferheld, Economa y petrleo, 36-40; Minute byA. V. Burbury, 11 December 1928, in FO

371/12730, NA; and Harris Gaylord Warrens Paraguay: An InformalHistory (Norman: University of

Oklahoma Press, 1949), 303.

94 Seiferheld, Economia y petrleo, 36-40. For attempt to buyBristol fighters from Britain, see Minute by A. V.

Burbury, 11 December 1928, in FO 371/12730, NA.

95 In Dpto. Archivo Contratos Reservado poca 1927-1929, MDN.

96 Ibid.

97 Contract dated 26 April 1927 between Schenoni (Head of theParaguayan Mission to Europe) and G. Joassart

(Fabrique National dArmes de Guerre, Lige), in Dpto. ArchivoContratos Reservado poca 1927-1929, MDN.

There are further contracts in this file between Schenoni andthe Fabrique National dArmes de Guerre from

1927-8.

98 In Dpto. Archivo Contratos Reservado poca 1927-1929, MDN.Information on the change of uniform

courtesy of Colonel Hugo Ramn Mendoza Martnez (Comando en Jefede las FF AA, Republica del Paraguay).

99 In Dpto. Archivo Contratos Reservado poca 1927-1929, MDN.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 In Dpto. Archivo Notas Contratos Ofertas poca 1927, 28, 29,30, 31, MDN. For more information on the

Danish arms deal see also FO 371/16519, f.90, NA.

104 In Dpto. Archivo Notas Contratos Ofertas poca 1927, 28, 29,30, 31, MDN.

105 Ibid. Exchange rates by the author at $4.839=1.

106 Bird (British Legation Asuncin) to Austen Chamberlain (FO),15 January 1929, in FO 371/13450, ff.192-4,

NA.

107 Nosworthy (La Paz) to John Simon (FO) enclosing AnnualPolitical Report on Bolivia, 27 January 1932

(received 3 March 1932), in FO 371/15802, f.348, NA.

108 Chairman of the Commission of Neutrals (White) to theMinister in Switzerland (Wilson) in Geneva, 2

February 1933, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933.The American Republics, 4: 265. See also

British Consulate (Rosario) to Macleay (Ambassador, BuenosAires), 1 March 1933, in FO 371/16585, f.150,

31

NA; Vaughan (La Paz) to John Simon (FO), 28 July 1932, in FO371/15789, f.214, NA; and Zook, Conduct,

193.

109 FO Memorandum by Roberts entitled Dispute between Boliviaand Paraguay in the Chaco, 16 September

1932, in FO 371/15789, ff.252-6, NA.

110 British Consulate (Rosario) to Macleay (Ambassador, BuenosAires), 1 March 1933, in FO 371/16585, f.150,

NA.

111 FO Memorandum by Roberts entitled Dispute between Boliviaand Paraguay in the Chaco, 16 September

1932, in FO 371/15789, ff.252-6, NA.

112 British Charg dAffaires (Asuncin) to Macleay (Buenos Aires)passed to FO, 31 August 1932, in FO

371/15789, f.261, NA.

113 British Air Attach [Group Captain Mayco*ck?] to BritishAmbassador (Buenos Aires), 18 December 1933,

in FO 371/16585, f.143, NA (see also FO 527/15, NA for moreinformation on French warplanes exported to

Paraguay).

114 Tottenham-Smith (British Legation Asuncin) to Lecke [FO?],11 January 1934, in FO 527/16, NA.

115 Clark Kerr (Santiago) to FO, 21 December 1928, in FO371/12731, NA. See also Kerr (British Legation

Santiago) to Austen Chamberlain (FO), 3 August 1928, in FO371/12733, NA.

116 Warren, Paraguay, 303; FO 371/16528, f.454, NA.

117 From Encarnacin it was 370 kms (231 miles) to Asuncin and1154 kms (721 miles) to Buenos Aires. The

Paraguayan railway no longer functions but at the desertedEncarnacin station a large sign details the distance

in kilometres north and south to Asuncin and Buenos Aires.

118 Seiferheld, Economa y petrleo, 35; H. A. Cunard Cummings(British Legation Asuncin) to Robertson

(Buenos Aires) (passed to FO), 12 December 1928, in FO371/13450, ff.183-90, NA.

119 R. Andrew Nickson, Historical Dictionary of Paraguay(Metuchen, NJ and London: Scarecrow Press, 1993),

413. The Caonero Paraguay is still in service with theParaguayan navy; the Caonero Humait is moored at

Asuncin as a Navy Museum.

120 Andrew Nickson, Historical Dictionary of Paraguay, 440-1,493-4.

121 Farcau, Chaco War, 48.

122 Ynsfran, ed., The Epic of the Chaco, p.123.

123 For more information on the Mennonites, see AnnemarieElisabeth Krause, Mennonite Settlement in the

Paraguayan Chaco (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Chicago,1952).

32

124 Cornelius J. Dyck, An Introduction to Mennonite History: APopular History of the Anabaptists and the

Mennonites (1967; Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1993), 325. Acopy in Spanish of Law 514 can be found in

Rudolf Plett, Presencia Menonita en el Paraguay (Asuncin:Instituto Bblico Asuncin, n.d.), 69-72.

125 Edgar Stoesz and Muriel T. Stackley, Garden in theWilderness: Mennonite Communities in the Paraguayan

Chaco 1927-1997 (Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada: MBC Publication,1999), 22.

126 Information from the staff of the Museo Unger, Filadelfia,Paraguay.

127 Stoesz and Stackley, Garden in the Wilderness, 12, 85.

128 Information from the staff of the Museo Unger, Filadelfia,Paraguay.

129 A.T. Cook, report entitled The Petroleum Fields of Bolivia,c.January 1925, in File 71972, Reports on

Bolivian Oilfields, June 1922-October 1923, British PetroleumArchive, University of Warwick, UK.

130 Quoted in John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics inWestern Warfare from the Middle Ages to the

Present (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1993), ix. See also van Creveld,Supplying War, 231.

Introduction Bolivia Conclusion

Text3: 0: Hughes, Matthew1: Logistics and Chaco War: Boliviaversus Paraguay, 1932-352: The Journal of Military History, Volume69, Number 2, April 2005, pp. 411-4373:muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_military_history/v069/69.2hughes.html